The Tragedy of the Commons is the title of an influential article written by Garrett Hardin, first published in the journal Science in 1968. The article describes a dilemma in which multiple individuals acting independently in their own self-interest can ultimately destroy a shared resource even where it is clear that it is not in anyone's long term interest for this to happen.
Modern commons
The commons dilemma stands as a model for a great variety of resource problems in society today such as water, land, fish, CIOs, and non-renewable energy sources like oil and coal. When water is used at a higher rate than the reservoirs are replenished, fish consumption exceeds its reproductive capacity or oil supplies are exhausted then we face a tragedy of the commons.
The Commons Dilemma
The commons dilemma is a specific class of social dilemma in which people's short-term selfish interests are at odds with long-term group interests and the common good. In academia a range of related terminology has also been used as shorthand for the theory or aspects of it, including resource dilemma, take-some dilemma, or alternatively common pool resource (CPR).
Motivational factors
First, the research shows that some people are more motivated than others to manage the common resource responsibly. Using the commons dilemma game, researchers found that people with "prosocial" value orientations harvest less from a resource during a period of scarcity. "Prosocial" individuals are also more inclined to engage in sustainable environmental behaviours such as taking public transport (instead of the car), conserving energy and water, as well as explaining their decisions in terms of environmental impact.
Strategic factors
Strategic factors also matter in commons dilemmas. One often studied strategic factor is the order in which people take harvests from the resource. In simultaneous play, all people harvest at the same time, whereas in sequential play people harvest from the pool according to a predetermined sequence—first, second, third, etc. There is a clear order effect in the latter games: The harvests of those who come first--the leaders--are higher than the harvest of those coming later—the followers. The interpretation of this effect is that the first players feel entitled to take more. Whereas with simultaneous play, people may adopt an equality rule, with sequential play, individuals adopt a first come-first served rule. Another strategic factor is the ability to build up reputations. Research found that people take less from the common pool in public situations than in anonymous private situations. Moreover those who harvest less gain greater prestige and influence within their group.
Structural factors
Much research has focused on when and why people would like to structurally rearrange the commons to prevent a tragedy. Hardin stated in his analysis of the Tragedy of the Commons that “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (p. 1244). One of the proposed solutions is to appoint a leader to regulate access to the commons. Not surprisingly groups are more likely to endorse a leader when a common resource is being depleted and when managing a common resource is perceived as a difficult task. Interestingly, groups prefer leaders who are elected, democratic, and prototypical of the group, and these leader types are more successful in enforcing cooperation. There is a general aversion against autocratic leadership--although it is quite an effective solution--possibly because of the fear of power abuse and corruption.
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